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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, regulators around the world have increased their 
focus on investigating and prosecuting corporate corruption. Many 
governments have recently adopted or enhanced their domestic anti-
corruption laws, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, 
Brazil, Canada, China, and Mexico. In March 2016, the French 
government will consider the adoption of a new criminal statute 
creating deferred prosecution agreements in France.1 In the United 
                                                                                                                                     
* Daniel Schimmel is a partner in Foley Hoag’s International Litigation and Arbitration 
Department, resident in New York. He leads the international arbitration and litigation practice 
of the New York office. He has acted as counsel and arbitrator in matters involving 
international corruption investigations.  
** Anthony Mirenda is a partner in Foley Hoag’s White Collar Crime and Government 
Investigations practice, representing corporations and their officers, directors and others in 
criminal and regulatory investigations, in complex civil litigation, and in confidential internal 
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Practices Act. 
1.  A deferred prosecution agreement is a mechanism to resolve a potential criminal 
charge before it is asserted, with the prosecution agreeing to defer bringing the charge for a 
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States, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have maintained anti-corruption 
enforcement as a high priority, initiating scores of investigations and 
obtaining hundreds of millions of dollars in penalties under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). Multiple public statements 
made by DOJ and SEC officials have left no doubt that this emphasis 
will continue in the future.2  
Against this backdrop, corrupt payments by third-party 
representatives such as agents, distributors, or consultants are one of 
the largest and most uncertain risks to companies that are subject to 
the FCPA or anti-corruption laws of other countries.3 When such 
corrupt payments do occur, United States regulators have made clear 
that a corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing 
and its willingness to cooperate in an investigation are factors they 
consider in deciding whether to commence, decline, or otherwise 
resolve a FCPA matter.4 The DOJ and the SEC similarly consider the 
extent to which the company has identified and disciplined the 
individuals responsible for the corporation’s alleged malfeasance.5 As 
                                                                                                                                     
period of time while the defendant agrees to satisfy certain conditions, typically including 
compliance program enhancements, with the expectation that, assuming no further 
misconduct, upon the successful completion of such enhancements, the prosecution would 
forego bringing the charge altogether. See also Marie Bellan, Un Nouvel Arsenal de Lutte 
Contre la Délinquance Financière, LES ECHOS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.lesechos.
fr/economie-france/budget-fiscalite/021673842508-loi-sapin-un-nouvel-arsenal-de-lutte-
contre-la-delinquance-financiere-1197812.php; Marie Bellan, Corruption Des Entreprises: Le 
Big Bang de la ‘Transaction Pénale,’ LES ECHOS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.lesechos.fr/
economie-france/budget-fiscalite/021674189235-corruption-des-entreprises-le-big-bang-de-la-
transaction-penale-1197811.php. 
2.  See, e.g., Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Remarks at the American 
Conference Institute’s 32nd Annual International Conference on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-
caldwell-delivers-remarks-american-conference; see also Andrew Ceresney, Director, 
Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Enforcement, Keynote Address at ACI’s 
32nd FCPA Conference (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-fcpa-
keynote-11-17-15.html. 
3.  See UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 60 (2012) [hereinafter FCPA RESOURCES GUIDE] (“DOJ’s and 
SEC’s FCPA enforcement actions demonstrate that third parties, including agents, consultants, 
and distributors, are commonly used to conceal the payment of bribes to foreign officials in 
international business transactions. Risk-based due diligence is particularly important with 
third parties and will also be considered by DOJ and SEC in assessing the effectiveness of a 
company’s compliance program.”). 
4.  See id. at 53. 
5.  Id. 
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a result, once a company learns that FCPA violations may have been 
committed by one of its agents or consultants, the company is under 
pressure to immediately self-investigate and take internal corrective 
measures.6 
Taking such corrective measures will often mean imposing a 
moratorium on payments to agents or business consultants suspected 
of wrongdoing, until, at the very least, the agent or consultant has 
agreed to cooperate in the FCPA investigation, including by agreeing 
to be interviewed by the company’s outside counsel, and more likely, 
until the suspicion that the underlying transaction was improper is 
resolved.7 While some agents or consultants may indeed cooperate in 
these efforts, others will not and will instead initiate legal proceedings 
to get paid, most commonly, through initiating international 
arbitrations outside the United States based on arbitration clauses that 
are commonly contained in most consulting agreements. The 
company is then placed in a difficult position: if it meets the 
expectations of US regulators and halts all payments to its corrupt 
contractor agent, the company exposes itself to an arbitration brought 
                                                                                                                                     
6.  For example, Siemens devoted over 1.5 million hours of billable time to its FCPA 
investigation, which took place in thirty-four countries and involved over 1,750 interviews and 
over 800 informational meetings. Dept. Of Justice Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. 
Siemens AG et al., No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2008/12/19/siemens-sentencing-memo.pdf (stating what 
Siemens’ attorneys spent); see also Press Release, Dept. Of Justice, Ralph Lauren Corporation 
Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $882,000 Monetary 
Penalty (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ralph-lauren-corporation-resolves-
foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay (acknowledging in settlement 
agreement Ralph Lauren’s “extensive, thorough, and timely cooperation, including self-
disclosure of the misconduct, voluntarily making employees available for interviews, [and] 
making voluntary document disclosures”). 
7.  When Siemens pled guilty to FCPA allegations in 2008, it agreed to impose “a 
moratorium on entering into new business consulting agreements or making payments under 
existing business consulting agreements until a complete collection and review was undertaken 
of all such agreements.” Dept. Of Justice Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Siemens 
A.G., No. 1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008); see also Sally Quillian, Deputy Attorney 
General, Dept. of Justice, Remarks at New York University School of Law Announcing New 
Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing, (Sept. 10, 2015), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-
new-york-university-school (“Effective today, if a company wants any consideration for its 
cooperation, it must give up the individuals, no matter where they sit within the company. And 
we’re not going to let corporations plead ignorance. If they don’t know who is responsible, 
they will need to find out. If they want any cooperation credit, they will need to investigate and 
identify the responsible parties, and then provide all non-privileged evidence implicating those 
individuals.”).  
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by the consultant or agent. On the other hand, if the company keeps 
paying its corrupt agent, it exposes itself to further criminal liability in 
the United States.8 
This growing dilemma for companies subject to the FCPA has 
raised a number of issues, including (1) what the burden of proof 
should be in international arbitration proceedings involving claims of 
corruption or bribery, (2) whether arbitrators should stay arbitrations 
pending an ongoing FCPA investigation and (3) whether there is 
anything companies can do to prepare for such arbitrations. 
I. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN ARBITRATION 
PROCEEDINGS 
One of the problems with corruption is that it is often very hard 
to prove. FCPA investigations are often commenced on the basis of 
circumstantial evidence or so-called “red flags,” indicating that 
corruption may have occurred. In the United States, such 
circumstantial evidence or red flags are sufficient grounds for halting 
payments to an agent or consultant suspected of wrongdoing. In fact, 
US regulators expect companies to take immediate remedial actions 
when such circumstantial evidence comes to light.9 
                                                                                                                                     
8.  Two 2014 decisions from the Swiss Supreme Court are illustrative of this point: on 
September 23, 2014, the Swiss Supreme Court dismissed a petition including a request to set 
aside an arbitral award and a request for a revision of the arbitral award. Pursuant to the award, 
the petitioner company was to pay a consultant US$115,000 in outstanding consultancy fees 
for assistance in preparing a bid for a tender for the construction and renovation of power 
plants. The company argued that it would likely face criminal sanctions if it were to comply 
with the award due to ongoing criminal investigations brought under the UK Bribery Act and 
the FCPA into potential corrupt acts engaged in by the consultant. In dismissing petitioner’s 
request, the Supreme Court explained that the company’s argument at most indicated that the 
company could be subject to criminal sanctions in the United Kingdom and the United States, 
not that the validity of the contract between the consultant and the company was actually 
affected by the alleged bribery. In addition, the Swiss Supreme Court also held that it had no 
basis for modifying the outcome of the arbitration because the company had failed to prove 
that bribery had actually occurred. Bundesgericht [BGer][Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 23, 
2014, 4A_231/2014 (Switz.); Bundesgericht [BGer][Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 23, 2014, 
4A_247/2014 (Switz.). 
9.  The DOJ and the SEC have repeatedly emphasized the importance for companies to 
take immediate action when signs of corrupt acts surface. For example, in 2014, Hewlett-
Packard paid US$108 million in fines after one of its subsidiaries was found to have paid 
bribes through agents and various shell companies to procure business in Mexico and Eastern 
Europe. In its press release, the SEC admonished Hewlett-Packard, stating that even though 
employees within the subsidiary had raised questions about the significant markup being paid 
to the agent and its subcontractors, the subsidiary had ignored these red flags and gone forward 
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However, in arbitral proceedings, mere red flags or 
circumstantial evidence are often not sufficient to establish a defense 
of corruption for non-payment of fees to an agent or consultant. This 
is because, in those types of cases, the laws of civil law countries 
often govern the contracts, the seat of the arbitration is often outside 
the United States, and a majority of the arbitrators in these arbitrations 
are often from civil law jurisdictions. Under these circumstances, the 
governing law will often require actual proof of corruption by clear 
evidence.10 Tribunals may primarily expect the parties to submit 
evidence in support of their claims or defenses with a limited 
opportunity to seek document disclosure.11 Furthermore, in many civil 
law jurisdictions, there is no culture of cooperation with law 
enforcement investigations. It is up to prosecutors and investigating 
magistrates to prove the existence of criminal conduct. These 
international arbitrations often highlight cultural differences between 
arbitrators. Depending on their legal culture and background, they 
may have very different perspectives on the company’s and the 
consultant’s duty to cooperate with law enforcement. They may view 
the criminal investigation as either central or tangential to the 
arbitration. 
The high burden of proof coupled with the strictly limited ability 
to obtain documents from the consultant will frequently make it 
impossible to prove the existence of corruption. This is especially the 
case because, in most instances, proof of the consultant’s activities 
will reside with him, and he will have no incentive to voluntarily 
disclose evidence of wrongful conduct.12 Accordingly, the company 
                                                                                                                                     
with the deal. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Hewlett-Packard With FCPA Violations: 
Company to Pay $108 Million to Settle Civil and Criminal Cases (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.
sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541453075. 
10.  Case No. 5622 of 1988, 19 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 105 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (providing 
that allegations of corruption must be proven “beyond doubt”); Case No. 7047 of 1994, 21 
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 79 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (finding that “[i]f the claimant’s claim based on the 
contract is to be voided by the defence of bribery, the arbitral tribunal, as any state court, must 
be convinced that there is indeed a case of bribery. A mere ‘suspicion’ by any member of the 
arbitral tribunal . . . is entirely insufficient to form such a conviction of the Arbitral 
Tribunal.”). 
11.  See Geoffrey C. Jr., Hazard, Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law 
Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017 (1998). 
12.  In World Duty Free Company Limited v. the Republic of Kenya, one of the key 
decisions to date in the investor-state arbitration context dealing with corruption, the tribunal 
only had occasion to rule on the effects of corruption on the claims at issue because the 
petitioning party itself revealed that it had made a US$2 million dollar personal donation to the 
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may well have to pay the potentially corrupt agent or consultant’s fees 
as well as arbitration costs, including a portion of the legal fees of the 
consultant under the prevailing view in international arbitration that 
costs follow the event. 
In those types of cases, some arbitral tribunals have lowered the 
standard of proof, allowed the introduction of circumstantial evidence 
or reversed the burden of proof by requiring the agent or consultant to 
disprove corruption once the company has set forth a prima facie case 
of corruption.13 Other tribunals however have been hesitant to engage 
in such burden-shifting.14 And some have found that there has to be a 
high burden of proof for claims of bribery or corruption on the basis 
that “fraud can never be taken lightly,”15 creating further uncertainty 
                                                                                                                                     
Kenyan president. As a result, the tribunal did not have to consider the appropriate standard of 
proof for proving corruption. World Duty Free Company Limited v. the Republic of Kenya, 
ICSID Case No. Arb/00/7, Award (October 4, 2006). 
13.  See, e.g., Case No. 6497 of 1994, 24 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 71 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) 
(tribunal sitting in Switzerland applying Swiss law held that that even though the party 
alleging bribery normally has the burden of proof, in some cases, tribunals may allow the party 
alleging bribery “to bring some relevant evidence for its allegations,” and then the tribunal 
may “exceptionally request the other party to bring some counterevidence, if such task is 
possible and not too burdensome”); see also Case No. 12990 of 2005, 24 ICC ICArb. Bull. 52 
(ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (allowing circumstantial evidence on the basis that unlawful nature of a 
contract is difficult to prove) as reported in Christian Albanesi & Emmanuel Jolivet, Dealing 
with Corruption in Arbitration: A Review of ICC Experience, 24 ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 27, 33 (2013). 
14.  See, e.g., Case No. 7047 of 1994, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 79 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) 
(stating “[i]f a claimant asserts claims arising from a contract, and the defendant objects that 
the claimant’s rights arising from the contract are null due to bribery, it is up to the defendant 
to present the fact of bribery and the pertaining evidence within the time limits allowed to him 
for presenting facts.”); see also Case No. 5622 of 1988, 19 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 105 (ICC Int’l 
Ct. Arb.) (holding that “bribery ha[d] not been proved doubt,” and even though circumstantial 
evidence is allowed to prove facts in contention, there must be “something more than likely 
facts”). 
15.  Case No. 6401 of 1992 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (unpublished) as reported in Albanesi 
& Jolivet, supra note 13, at 32 (applying “preponderance of the evidence” standard to 
substantive claims but holding that based on the laws of the United States and the Philippines, 
the countries to which the dispute was connected, a higher standard had to be applied to the 
allegations of corruption because “fraud in civil cases must be proven to exist by clear and 
convincing evidence amounting to more than a mere preponderance, and cannot be justified by 
a mere speculation”); see also EDF Services Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. Arb/05/13, ¶ 
221 (Oct. 8, 2009) (stating “corruption must be proven and is notoriously difficult to prove, 
since, typically, there is little or no physical evidence. The seriousness of the accusation of 
corruption in the present case, considering that it involves officials at the highest level of the 
Romanian Government at the time, demands clear and convincing evidence. There is general 
consensus among international tribunals and commentators regarding the need for a high 
standard of proof of corruption.”).  
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for those companies who are faced with defending FCPA proceedings 
in the United States and arbitration proceedings elsewhere in the 
world. 
In light of the challenge of proving corruption, the arbitral award 
in many cases will turn on whether the consultant satisfied its 
contractual obligations, in particular the consultant’s obligation to 
retain and submit proofs of his services, as well as the contractual 
obligation to cooperate with audits and investigations. Reviewing 
proofs of services makes it possible for tribunals to assess whether the 
consultant performed actual services, or merely funneled payments to 
foreign public officials (i.e., bribes) in exchange for confidential 
information about the bids submitted by competitors.16 Many 
consulting agreements contain language requiring consultants to 
retain proofs of their activities, to submit these documents along with 
their invoices, and to cooperate with audits. In some cases, these 
terms are identified as “essential” or “material” in the contract itself. 
In certain civil law jurisdictions, however, such contractual 
obligations will be viewed as merely ancillary, not main obligations, 
if the parties’ course of conduct demonstrates that compliance was not 
essential in practice.17 Therefore, a tribunal may examine the parties’ 
course of conduct, beyond the four corners of the contracts, and, 
                                                                                                                                     
16.  See, e.g., Case No. 12990 of 2005, 24 ICC ICArb. Bull. 52 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) 
(holding that underlying purpose of agreement was unlawful where claimant was unable to 
produce evidence that it had performed any of its obligations in relation to the agreements 
between the parties); Case No. 13914 of 2008, 24 ICC ICArb. Bull. 77 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) 
(finding that there was “clear and convincing” evidence of bribery based on several red flags 
raised by claimant’s actions, including his inability to disclose bank and tax records, and his 
inability to prove the legitimacy of several wire transfers from his account to relatives of a 
state official) as reported in Albanesi & Jolivet, supra note 13, at 32-34. 
17.  In construing contractual obligations, certain decisions of the Swiss Tribunal 
Federal have focused on whether a contractual obligation was a “main” or “ancillary” 
obligation. Bundesgericht [BGer][Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 15, 2000, 4C.105/2000, 12, 
79 (Switz.). Other decisions have focused on the subjective and objective intent of the parties. 
SI X. SA c. A., Tribunal Federal 4A 379/2011 (December 2, 2011). The Swiss Tribunal 
Federal has held that the “apparently clear meaning of the terms is not necessarily 
determinative, such that a purely literal interpretation is precluded. Even if a contractual term 
appears to be crystal clear at first sight, it might not precisely convey the meaning of the 
agreement, depending on other contract terms, the goal pursued by the parties, or other 
circumstances. It is not appropriate, however, to depart from the literal words adopted by the 
parties when there is no serious reason to believe that such literal meaning did not actually 
convey their intent.” Id. at 5. 
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depending on the parties’ course of conduct, they may excuse the 
consultant’s failure to comply with these obligations.18 
II. STAYING ARBITRATION PENDING COMPLETION OF 
FCPA INVESTIGATION 
In 2007, an arbitral tribunal awarded Siemens A.G. (“Siemens”) 
US$217 million in an ICSID arbitration Siemens brought against 
Argentina. One year later, Siemens pleaded guilty to FCPA violations 
in connection with the Argentine contract, paying US$1.6 billion to 
regulators in the United States and in Germany. Subsequently, 
Siemens waived the arbitral award against Argentina.19 The Siemens 
arbitration raises the question of whether arbitral tribunals should 
consider staying arbitration proceedings if there is a parallel criminal 
investigation ongoing in the respondent’s home country. This would 
prevent situations in which arbitral awards are later called into 
question on the basis that they rewarded a corrupt party. In addition, a 
stay would also allow for a fuller development of the facts to meet the 
greater goal of deterring bribery and corruption, especially since 
tribunals will often not themselves engage in a deep factual 
investigation into the consultant’s potentially corrupt practices. 
That said, a goal of arbitration is efficiency, and tribunals are 
increasingly focused on resolving disputes without undue delays.20 
                                                                                                                                     
18.  ICC arbitrations have considered course of performance in a variety of contexts. 
See, e.g., Case No. 8362 of 1995, 22 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 164 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (assessing 
whether claimant’s course of performance amounted to consent to termination of claimant’s 
distribution agreement with respondent); Case No. 6527 of 1991, 18 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 44 
(ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (“The attention is therefore to be concentrated on the actions performed 
and the behaviour adopted by the parties, in order to establish whether the defendant’s 
withdrawal from the [c]ontract was justified under the circumstances.”); see also Joshua 
Karton, The Arbitral Role in Contractual Interpretation, 6 J. OF INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1, 4–
41 (2015). In its FCPA Resource Guide, the DOJ also recommends that companies 
periodically update and review its third-party relationships, including exercising audit rights, 
providing annual training and requesting annual compliance certification. See FCPA 
RESOURCES GUIDE, supra note 3, at 60. 
19. Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, award, (Jan. 
17, 2007); see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Seven Former Siemens Executives with 
Bribing Leaders in Argentina (Dec. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-
263.htm (discussing Siemens waiver of its arbitral award).  
20.  ICC Rule 30(1) provides, unless the ICC Court sets a different deadline, “[t]he time 
limit within which the arbitral tribunal must render its final award is six months.” The ICDR 
International Dispute Resolution Procedures also emphasizes the need to promptly resolve 
disputes. Under article 15.8 of the CPR International Administered Arbitration Rules, “[t]he 
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Illustrative of this point, in a 2012 arbitration brought in Switzerland 
under Swiss law by a consultant for payment of outstanding fees, the 
respondent company sought a stay of arbitration proceedings on the 
basis that it would expose itself to criminal liability under the FCPA 
and the UK Bribery Act because criminal investigations had been 
initiated by the DOJ and the UK Serious Fraud Office concerning 
potential corrupt projects in which the consultant had participated.21 
The tribunal refused to issue a stay of proceedings, emphasizing that 
the DOJ had not indicated a likely timeframe for the completion of 
the investigation, and that the consultant’s interest in obtaining an 
award outweighed the company’s interest in suspending its 
contractual obligations until the termination of an investigation with 
an unknown date of completion.22 Similarly, arbitrators might also 
seek to keep the criminal investigation separate and independent from 
the arbitral proceedings.23 As a result, stays continue to be a rare, 
extraordinary measure in arbitration proceedings, even where 
allegations of corruption or bribery have already surfaced. 
That is particularly true because the rule in many civil law 
countries that civil proceedings are stayed pending the resolution of 
related criminal matters is generally not applicable in international 
arbitration proceedings.24 In France, that rule is embodied in Article 4 
                                                                                                                                     
final award should in most circumstances be rendered within 12 months of the constitution of 
the Tribunal.” 
21.  See arbitral decision cited in Swiss Supreme Court Case Nos. 4A_231/2014 and 
4A_247/2014, supra note 8. 
22.  Id.; see also Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 47 (July 19, 2007) (denying request by respondent to stay arbitral 
proceedings pending outcome of German court proceedings involving documents seized by 
German prosecutors in connection with investigation into corrupt acts committed by claimant 
given that it was unknown when the German court would come to a decision regarding 
whether  respondent could get access to the documents).  
23.  See Yasmine Lahlou & Marina Matousekova, The Role of the Arbitrator in 
Combatting Corruption, INT'L BUS. L. J. 6, 624 (2012) (“Unlike domestic judges, arbitrators do 
not carry out the public service of justice on behalf of a State. They are not bound by domestic 
rules of law, including criminal law against corruption. An international arbitrator is not the 
guardian of the public interest promoted by the criminal statutes of each State connected with 
the dispute, irrespective of the imperative nature of those laws domestically.”). 
24.  Id. at 625. 
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of the French Code of Criminal Procedure.25 That rule, however, does 
not apply to parallel arbitration proceedings.26 
CONCLUSION 
To prevent corruption from occurring in the first instance, 
companies should place an emphasis on conducting due diligence on 
third-party consultants and agents prior to engagement to prevent 
FCPA or UK Bribery Act violations from occurring in the first 
place.27 Companies should of course build anti-corruption protections 
into their agreements with such consultants and agents by including 
provisions that, for example, contractually require consultants and 
agents to provide periodic representations that they are in compliance 
with anti-corruption laws, retain records, provide meaningful proofs 
of services, and personally cooperate with audits and investigations as 
material conditions precedent to receiving payments, as well as 
payment suspension and contract termination provisions tied to 
compliance. In light of the different rules of contract interpretation, 
companies also should make sure that these contract terms are 
respected and actually enforced as part of the ordinary course of the 
parties’ performance of their obligations. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
25.  CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN] art. 4, (Fr). Article 4 of the French 
Code of Criminal Procedure states that, when criminal proceedings are initiated, related civil 
proceedings are stayed and, in particular, no civil judgment may be issued. 
26.  See Lahlou & Matousekova, supra note 23, at n.18.  
27.  See FCPA RESOURCES GUIDE, supra note 3, at 60.  
 
